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Abstract
We investigate monetary policy under the assumption that a coun-
try’s capital market is “open” under the WTO framework while the
exchange rate is ﬁxed. Our purpose is to determine if it is possible
in this case for the economy to maintain an eﬀective monetary policy
for stabilizing the domestic economy. For this, we suggest two insti-
tutional restrictions. Given the restrictions, we demonstrate within a
macro-dynamic model that monetary policy can still be eﬀective. The
implication of such an institutional design for an exchange rate regime
is also discussed with special reference to small and less development
economies.
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11 Introduction
Many central banks have the objective of protecting the value of their domes-
tic currency. This may imply two stabilities: 1) stability against domestic
price; 2) stability against foreign currencies. Among the variety of choices, a
ﬁxed exchange regime is the best means to achieve stability against foreign
currencies.
Yet, it is seemingly impossible to achieve these two stabilities simultane-
ously under the WTO framework, according to which countries are assumed
to open their capital markets. By the theorem of open economy trilemma, if
a capital market is open while the exchange rate is ﬁxed, the monetary au-
thority will lose its independence in stabilizing the domestic economy because
of its activities in the foreign exchange market. Meanwhile, capital inﬂow
and outﬂow will strengthen the connection between the domestic interest
rate and the interest rate in the world market. This leaves the monetary
policy via interest rate mechanism further ineﬀective for stabilizing the do-
mestic economy. However, if the exchange rate is ﬂoating, not only does the
monetary authority not have to be concerned with the exchange rate so that
its monetary policy can be independent in stabilizing domestic economy, but
also the interest rate connection will be weakened because of uncertainty in
the exchange rate. This has been the main result since the Mundel-Fleming
model was developed in the 1960s.1 The recent new open economy macroeco-
nomics initiated by the Redux model of Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ (1995) does not
change the basic result.2 The trilemma theorem has also led to the current
bipolar view, which basically rejects the ﬁxed exchange regime as a viable
possibility for an exchange rate system.3
Stability against foreign currency is perhaps more important for small
and less developed economies because they are usually more vulnerable to
external shocks. Stability is also a requirement for these countries to attract
the foreign direct investment that is crucial for their economic development.
This paper examines monetary policy for small and less developed economies.
On the assumption that a stable exchange rate is still pursued by the govern-
ment, we investigate whether it is possible for the government to maintain
an eﬀective monetary policy for stabilizing the domestic economy under a
1See Mundell (1963, 1964), Fleming (1962) and Dornbusch (1976).
2For a review on new open economy macroeconomics, see Lane (2001). For the most
recent Redux model, see Obstfeld (2006).
3See Fischer (2002), Summer (2000) among others.
2ﬁxed exchange regime while the capital market is “open” under the WTO
framework.
It is well known that the literature that has generated the trilemma theo-
rem implies some form of institution which makes all ﬁnancial assets perfectly
substitutable, and thus the variety of interest rates can be merged essentially
into one in terms of volatility.4 Because one of the interest rates, such as the
bond rate, must be equal to the interest rate in the world market under the
ﬁxed exchange regime when the capital market is open, the other interest
rates, such as the loan interest rate, can hardly be impacted by monetary
policy. Monetary policy thus loses its eﬀectiveness in stabilizing the domestic
economy via the interest rate mechanism.
This discussion indicates that if there exists some institutional restrictions
under which the variety of ﬁnancial assets are not perfectly substitutable, the
interest rates could be varied in diﬀerent directions, and thus monetary policy
could be eﬀective in stabilizing the domestic economy even if the exchange
rate is ﬁxed and the capital market is “open” under the WTO framework.
In this paper, we suggest the following institutional restrictions:
Restriction 1: There is a block for the loan issued from com-
mercial banks to be used for ﬁnancial investments, such as buying
bonds on the bond market;
Restriction 2: There is a block for commercial banks to engage
in the business of ﬁnancial investment (such as buying bonds).
We assume that these institutional restrictions can be practically imple-
mented under the appropriate regulations within the commercial banking
system. In the following analysis, we evaluate the eﬀectiveness of monetary
policy under such institutional restrictions within a macro dynamic model
speciﬁed for a small and less developed economy. Section 2 lays out the
model. Section 3 provides the analysis, which allows us to demonstrate our
ﬁndings. Section 4 discusses further implications for a small and less devel-
oped economy .
2 The Model
Given the institutional restrictions suggested in the last section, we construct
a simple macro-dynamic model that will provide a basis for evaluating the
monetary policy of a small and less developed economy.
4The empirically observed deviations among diﬀerent interest rates are often termed a
risk premium.
32.1 The Interest Rates
Standard macroeconomic models often consider only one interest rate. As we
have mentioned, this implies an institution which makes all ﬁnancial assets
perfectly substitutable. Yet under our two institutional restrictions, this
substitution no longer holds, and therefore we have to consider in our model
the various interest rates. These may include the bond rate, inter-bank rate
(federal fund rate in the US), loan rate, the deposit rate at commercial banks,
and the rates for loan and deposit at the discount window of the central
bank. Also, we remark that the money in our hypothetical economy can be
circulated beyond the domestic economy. This indicates that the monetary
authority may have diﬃculty in controlling the money supply and therefore
it simply leaves the money to be endogenuously determined by demand.
Because the economy is small while the capital market is “open” under
the WTO framework, the bond rate rb,t should be connected to the world
capital markets. To simplify our analysis we set this exogenous bond rate to
a constant rw. This indicates
rb,t = rw (1)
The deposit rate at the commercial bank is assumed to be zero. The two dis-
count rates can be regarded as policy variables, whose determination will be
discussed in Section 2.3. Our major discussion is thus on how the commercial
loan rate and inter-bank rate are determined.
In the ﬁrst place, we can assume that there is a very close relationship
between the inter-bank rate and loan rate. For example, we assume that
rt = b0 + brri,t, b0,br > 0; rt ≥ ri,t (2)
where ri,t is the inter-bank rate. This assumption is supported by empirical
evidence from those economies in which administrative bodies play no part
in determining the commercial loan rate. To some extent, we can regard the
process of loan supply as the commercial bank ﬁrst getting the fund at the
inter-bank market and then supplying the loan to the loan demander whose
investment project is evaluated to be rewardable. This leaves us only to
discuss how the inter-bank rate ri,t is determined. On the assumption that
the commercial bank is permitted, at their discretion, to borrow or deposit
their reserve at the discount window of the central bank, we may obtain the
following proposition with regard to the determination of the inter-bank rate.
Proposition 1 Let d1,t and d2,t denote the two discount rates, the deposit
rate and the loan rate respectively, of the central bank with d1,t ≤ d2,t. Under
the two institutional restrictions as expressed in Section 1, the determination
4of the inter-bank rate will follow
d1,t ≤ ri,t ≤ d2,t (3)
while the two discount rates can be set by the central bank at its own discre-
tion.
The proof of this proposition is trivial. Assume that d1,t and d2,t are given
while ri,t > d2,t. The demander at the inter-bank market will switch to the
discount window to borrow the fund. This will reduce demand at the inter-
bank market, causing the inter-bank rate to go down. On the other hand, if
ri,t < d1,t, then the loan supplier will prefer to deposit money at the discount
window rather than supply the money at the inter-bank market. This will
reduce the loan supply, causing the inter-bank rate to go up.
It should be noted that this proposition will not hold without the insti-
tutional restrictions we have suggested. Speciﬁcally, the central bank cannot
set the two discount rates at its “discretion” so it cannot use the two dis-
count rates as policy variables for stabilization purpose even if the inequality
(3) still holds. Here, for the purpose of stabilization, the two discount rates
should be adjustable to any positive value without incurring any negative
eﬀect such as continual arbitrage by individuals or ﬁnancial intermediates
of ﬁrst borrowing money from commercial banks or the central bank at a
lower rate and then buying bonds for a higher return. For example, with-
out Restriction 2, d2,t cannot be set below the bond rate rw. Otherwise,
commercial banks will borrow money from the central bank to invest in the
bond market. Similarly, to avoid arbitrage by individuals or other ﬁnancial
intermediates of borrowing money from the commercial bank in order to buy
bonds while Restriction 1 is absent, the interest rate on commercial loans rt
must be higher than the bond rate rw. From (2) and (3), this also means
that there is some lower boundary to set d2,t given the externally determined
bond rate rw.
Note that equation (3) in Proposition 1 also indicates that if d1,t = d2,t =
rd,t, then
ri,t = rd,t (4)
Therefore, if the two discount rates merge, the inter-bank rate ri,t should also
be equal to the merged discount rate rd,t.
2.2 Price and Output
The real sector of the model resembles the standard Keynesian model of the
AS-AD type. Following recent discussion on the Philips curve of the New
5Keynesian model,5 we may assume that the aggregate supply curve takes the
form
pt = α0 + αppt−1 + αyyt−1 (5)
where pt is the inﬂation rate and yt can be regarded as an output measure.6
With regard to output (or the aggregate demand curve), we may assume
that it is determined by the real interest rate on commercial loans rt−pt and
the real exchange rate γt:
yt = y(rt − pt,γt) (6)
where y
′
1 < 0, y
′
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where xt is the nominal exchange rate (domestic currency over foreign cur-
rency); Pt is the domestic price index and P
f
t is the price index in foreign
countries.
We remark that the determination of output could be more complicated.
Yet our major concern in this paper is with monetary policy and exchange
rate on the assumption that both of them may have an impact on the real side
of the economy. For this purpose, our formulation here should be suﬃcient
while keeping the analysis as simple as possible.
2.3 The Monetary Policy
When money is endogenous, the monetary authority will target interest rates
for the purpose of stabilizing the domestic economy. Because it is the discount
rates through Proposition 1 that determine the inter-bank rate, which further
determines the loan rate via (2) and then output via (6), we suggest that
the monetary authority should use the discount rate as a major instrument
of its monetary policy. To simplify our analysis, we even assume one (rather
than two) discount rate so that d1,t = d2,t = rd,t. As expressed in (4) the
inter-bank rate in this case is simply equal to the discount rate rd,t. Suppose
that the central bank sets the target inﬂation rate and target interest rate
at p∗ and r∗ respectively. Then its interest rate rule (or Taylor rule) can be
expressed as
rd,t − rd,t−1 = θp(pt−1 − p
∗) − θ1(rt−1 − r
∗) (8)
5For the recent research on this topic, see Mankiw and Reis (2002, 2007), Gali and
Gertler(1999), and Beyer et al. (2005), among others.
6As in the literature, yt can be measured as (but not limited to) the percentage deviation
of output from its trend at the steady state.
6where θp,θ1 > 0.
The equation (8) can only be regarded for stabilizing the domestic econ-
omy. The central bank may also have a responsibility to stabilize the ex-
change rate, and may trade on the foreign exchange market to serve this




can be held via the central bank’s trading on the foreign exchange market.
3 The Analysis
In this section, we shall provide analysis of the model constructed in the
previous section.
3.1 The Intensive Form of the Model
We shall ﬁrst transform the model into an intensive form. To keep our




t = (1 + ¯ pw)P
f
t−1 (10)
b0 = 0, b1 = 1 (11)
Assumption (10) implies that we do not attempt to model the dynamics of
P
f
t and thus simply assume that it grows at a constant rate ¯ pw. Assumption
(11) is in regard to the parameters in (2). It indicates that the loan rate
rt is equal to the inter-bank rate and we therefore do not have to settle the
parameters b0 and b1 in our dynamic analysis.
We now provide the following proposition regarding the intensive form of
our model.
Proposition 2 Given assumption (10) and (11), the intensive form of the
model (2) - (9) can be written as
rt = θ0 + θrrt−1 + θppt−1 (12)
pt = α0 + αppt−1 + αyy(rt−1 − pt−1,γt−1) (13)
γt =
(1 + ¯ pw)γt−1
1 + α0 + αppt−1 + αyy(rt−1 − pt−1,γt−1)
(14)
where θ0 = θ1r∗ − θpp∗ and θr = 1 − θ1.
7The proof of this proposition is given in the appendix. Apparently, equa-
tion (12)-(14) forms a standard discrete time dynamic system in three di-
mensions (pt, γt, rt). Given the solutions on pt, γt and rt, the output yt can
also be determined by the function y( ).
3.2 The Steady States
Next, we consider the steady state. From equation (14), it can be found
that for the economy to possess a steady state, the steady state of domestic
inﬂation ¯ p must be equal to pw, the inﬂation in the world market. This
further implies from (12) that the central bank has to set the target inﬂation
rate p∗ to the world inﬂation rate pw. The following proposition regards the
determination of the steady state.
Proposition 3 For the dynamical system (12)-(14), there is a unique steady
state equilibrium (¯ r, ¯ p, ¯ γ) with ¯ γ  = 0 given by




(θ0 + θp¯ pw)




[−α0 + (1 − αp)¯ pw]
The proof of this proposition is again provided in the appendix.
3.3 Monetary Policy in a Closed Economy
To observe the transmission mechanism of monetary policy clearly, we ﬁrst
consider the simple case of a closed economy. In this case, only rule (8) is
relevant, while y(rt − pt,γt) can be replaced by y(rt − pt). Suppose that the
monetary policy (8) is not in action, that is, rt = r0. We ﬁrst ﬁnd that there
might be a destabilizing mechanism which makes the economy inherently
unstable:
p ↑, (r − p) ↓, y ↑, p ↑ (15)
This instability can be found by observing equation (13) with y(rt − pt,γt)
to be replaced by y(r0 − pt). In this case, the system is one dimensional:
pt = p(pt−1). It is well known that if
p
′ = αp − αyy
′ > 1 (16)
8the system will be inherently unstable.
Adding monetary policy rule (8) will stabilize the economy by the usual
transmission mechanism of monetary policy:
p ↑, (r − p) ↑, y ↓, p ↓ (17)
As discussed in the literature,7 this transmission mechanism may work well
only if the adjustment speed θp is high enough so that the interest rate eﬀect
resulting from rule (8) and expressed in (17) can cover the price eﬀect of
destabilization as expressed in (15). On the other hand, the economy could
be cyclically explosive if θp is too large. This indicates that a Hopf bifurcation
may exist with regard to θp. The following proposition detects the existence
of Hopf bifurcation for our model of a closed economy.8
Proposition 4 Consider the dynamic system composed of (12) and (13)
with y(rt − pt,γt) to be replaced by y(rt − pt). Let J be the Jacobian matrix
of the system evaluated at the steady state and λ1,2 as the two eigenvalues of
J. Suppose that
θr + αp − αyy
′ < 2, (αp − αyy
′)θr < 1 (18)
where y′ is the derivative of y evaluated at the steady state. Then there exists
a θp denoted as θ∗
p such that in the neighborhood of θ∗
p
1. λ1,2 are complex conjugates;
2. the modulus of the complex conjugates denoted as |λ1,2| can be either
below or above 1 depending on the castellation of the structure parame-
ters. In particular,
(a) |λ1,2| < 1 when θp < θ∗
p;
(b) |λ1,2| = 1 when θp = θ∗
p;











7See for instance, Chiarella, Flaschel, Gong and Semmler (2003).
8For the related references on the existence of Hopf bifurcation in a two dimensional
system of discrete time dynamics, see Guckenheimer and Holmes (1986, p. 162).
9According to this proposition, even if αp−αyy′ > 1 so that the economy is
inherently unstable without intervention from the government, adding mon-
etary policy rule (8) can stabilize the economy if condition (18) is satisﬁed
and θp is set at an appropriate level. Because the parameters θr and θp are
always controllable, one thus ﬁnds that the central bank can always match
the condition (18).
To illustrate the result, we provide the following simulation. The output
function y( ) for this simulation is assumed to be linear:
yt = C − B(rt − pt)
The parameters for this simulation are given in Table 1. Some of the pa-
rameters (those in interest rate (12) and price (13) equations) in this table
are closed to the empirically estimated parameters for the current Chinese
economy.9
Table 1: Parameters for Simulation
α0 αy αp θ0 θr C B
-0.002 0.1042 0.5781 0.0123 0.5262 0.1600 5.000
Given these parameters, we ﬁnd that the instability condition (16) is
satisﬁed. The initial conditions for these simulations are set as follows: p0 =
0.004, y0 = 0.03, r0 = 0.03. With respect to the bifurcation parameter θp,
we set it to 0.6, 0.05 and 0.9, respectively.
Here we illustrate the eﬀectiveness of the monetary policy rule (8) as
expressed in (17). If the interest rate eﬀect resulting from the monetary
policy rule (8) is suﬃcient, indicating an appropriate adjustment speed θp,
the economy in this case can be stabilized (see Figure 1).
On the other hand, if the interest rate eﬀect is not suﬃcient, indicating
too low of an adjustment speed θp, the price eﬀect of the destabilization
mechanism as expressed in (15) will be dominant and the economy will be
divergent (see Figure 2).
Finally, if the interest rate eﬀect is too strong, indicating too high of a
θp, the economy could be cyclically explosive (see Figure 3)
3.4 Monetary Policy in an Open Economy with a Fixed
Exchange Regime
Now let us go back to the open economy and a system composed of (12) -
(14) with the steady state given in Proposition 3. The following proposition
regards its stability property.
9See Gao and Yang (2007).
10Figure 1: Suﬃcient Interest Rate Eﬀect via Monetary Policy Rule (8): Closed
Economy, θp = 0.6
11Figure 2: Insuﬃcient Interest Rate Eﬀect via Monetary Policy Rule (8):
Closed Economy, θ = 0.05
12Figure 3: Over Suﬃcient Interest Rate Eﬀect via Monetary Policy Rule (8):
Closed Economy, θp = 0.9
13Proposition 5 For the dynamical system (12)-(14), the steady state equi-
librium (¯ r, ¯ p, ¯ γ) is locally asymptotically stable if, and only if,
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x=¯ r−¯ p,z=¯ γ
and
Π3 = (1 − θr) − (1 + θr)(αp − αyy1) + θpαyy1 + αyy2θr
¯ γ
1 + ¯ p
−[θpαyy1 − θr(αp − αyy1)]
 
(1 + θr)
+(1 − θr)(αp − αyy1) + θpαyy1 − αyy2
¯ γ
1 + ¯ p
 
.
In addition, a Hopf bifurcation occurs when (20) holds and Π3 = 0.
The proof of this proposition is given in the appendix.
Given that the y2 < 0, condition (20) actually gives an upper boundary
for the equilibrium real exchange rate.
¯ γ < ¯ γ
∗ := 2
(1 + ¯ p)(1 + αp)
αyy2









From equation (7), we also ﬁnd that there is an upper boundary for the
central bank to set its target nominal exchange rate x∗ if it wants the steady
state of economy to be stable.
The parameter Π3 can be treated as a quadratic function in θp, that is,
Π3(θp) = π0 + π1θp + π2 (θp)
2
This indicates that Π3(θp) = 0 will occur two times and therefore there might
be two Hopf birfurcations in θp. Note that the coeﬃcient of the second order
term π2 is negative. Hence, if Π3(0) < 0, then condition Π3(θp) > 0 is satisﬁed
for 0 < θ∗
p,1 < θp < θ∗
p,2. Further , Hopf bifurcation occurs at θp = θ∗
p,i for
i = 1,2. This implies either a θp (θp < θ∗
p,1) that is too low or a θp (θp > θ∗
p,2)
that is too high, may destabilize the economy. Only a moderate adjustment
in θp can stabilize the economy.
14Again we shall now provide the following simulation to prove the stability
property as expressed in Proposition 5. The production function now takes
the form
yt = −0.16 − 4.5(rt − pt) + 0.05γt
We set pw at 0.0025 while the other parameters are the same values as in
Table 1. The initial conditions are set as follows: p0 = 0.002, y0 = 0.03,
r0 = 0.026, γ0 = 6.
For the set of parameters given, the conditions θr < 1 and (20) are always





p,2 ≈ 0.857. In Figure 4-6, we choose θp = 0.0047, 0.15 and 1.
Again, if the interest rate eﬀect resulting from the monetary policy rule
(8) is insuﬃcient, indicating too small of an adjustment speed (θp = 0.0047),
the economy will be unstable (see Figure 4).
On the other hand, if the interest rate eﬀect is suﬃcient, indicating an
appropriate adjustment speed (θp = 0.15), the economy will be stable (see
Figure 5).
Finally, if the interest rate eﬀect is excessive, indicating too high of an
adjustment speed (θp = 1), the economy will be cyclically explosive (see
Figure 6).
We thus demonstrate that under our two institutional restrictions mone-
tary policy (8) can be eﬀective even if the nominal exchange rate x is ﬁxed
and the capital market is “open” under the WTO framework.
4 Discussion
This paper studies the monetary policy for a small and less developed econ-
omy when the capital market is “open” under the WTO framework and when
stability in the exchange rate is pursued by the government. According to
the theorem of open economy trilemma, it seems impossible to maintain the
independence of monetary policy for stabilizing the domestic economy in this
case. Yet the open economy trilemma is eﬀective only under a certain type
of institution. For this, we suggest two institutional restrictions. Given the
institutional restrictions, we study the monetary policy in a model of an open
small economy. We ﬁnd that monetary policy will be eﬀective in this case
even if the capital market is “open” and the exchange rate is ﬁxed. However,
several factors still need to be clariﬁed in this discussion.
First, this paper is not a challenge to the theorem of open economy
trilemma. We only state that the capital market is “open” under the WTO
framework. The suggested institutional arrangements should be interpreted
15Figure 4: Insuﬃcient Interest Rate Eﬀect via Monetary Policy Rule (8):
Closed Economy, θp = 0.0047
16Figure 5: Suﬃcient Interest Rate Eﬀect via Monetary Policy Rule (8): Open
Economy, θ = 0.15
17Figure 6: Excessive Interest Rate Eﬀect via Monetary Policy Rule (8): Open
Economy, θp = 1
18as friction that means the capital markets are not fully open. By restrict-
ing the ﬁnancial decisions of the commercial banks, the full openness of the
capital market is blocked.
Second, there is still a sustainability issue for a country to adopt the ﬁxed
exchange regime in that the target exchange rate could be unsustainable.
Because the central bank has limited foreign exchange reserves, it cannot
continually use its exchange reserves to stabilize its target exchange rate.
However, this issue really depends on how the government sets the target
exchange rate. Suppose that the government sets the target exchange rate
x∗ beyond the equilibrium level or deliberately under-values the domestic
currency. Then, interventions from the central bank will in most cases appear
to be the purchase of foreign currency with its domestic currency. This may
eﬀectively prevent a ﬁnancial crisis, that is, the shortage of foreign exchange
reserves while the target exchange rate is unsustainable. Indeed, the higher
the target exchange rate is (or the more under-valued the domestic currency
is), the greater the possibility for the exchange rate to be sustainable.
Finally, we discuss the welfare eﬀect of such a system design. One can
argue that the under-valuation of domestic currency may be at the expense
of the welfare of domestic citizens while letting foreigners enjoy domestic
products and services at a discount. While there might be a welfare loss for
domestic citizens, a stable and under-valued domestic currency may accrue
additional beneﬁts from the under-valued economic resources of the domestic
country. The under-valued economic resources may create an advantage by
increasing the export of domestic products and in attracting foreign direct
investment. All of these factors are important for a less developed economy
where unutilized economic resources, such as labor in rural areas, are huge.10
Export promotion and foreign direct investment may activate these economic
resources. Consequently, the welfare of domestic citizens can be improved.
Although the net result is not clear, we already know that such a design of
the exchange rate regime will not necessarily cause a welfare loss for domestic
citizens in a less developed economy.
5 Appendix
5.1 The Proof of Proposition 2
Equation (12) is simply from (8) and (4) when equation (11) holds and the
two discount rates are merged. Equation (13) is trivial from (5) when yt−1 is
10This feature of a less developed economy is what Lewis, a 1979 Nobel laureate, de-
scribed in his seminal paper on development economics (see Lewis 1954).
19replaced by (6). To prove (14), we divide both sides of (7) by γt−1 while in














Note that here xt = xt−1 = x∗, Pt = (1 + pt−1)Pt−1 and P
f
t = (1 + ¯ pw)P
f
t−1.
We thus ﬁnd (14).
5.2 The Proof of Proposition 3
Let (¯ r, ¯ p, ¯ γ) be the ﬁxed point of the system (12)-(14). It then satisﬁes
¯ r = θ0 + θr¯ r + θp¯ p, (21)
¯ p = α0 + αp¯ p + αy¯ y, (22)
¯ γ =
(1 + ¯ pw)¯ γ
1 + α0 + αp¯ p + αy¯ y
, (23)
where
¯ y = y(¯ r − ¯ p, ¯ γ). (24)
Assume ¯ γ  = 0. Then, it follows from (23) and (22) that 1 + ¯ p = 1 + ¯ pw and
hence
¯ p = ¯ pw. (25)
Substituting (25) into (22), we solve ¯ y as in the proposition. Substituting (24)
and (25) into (21), we obtain ¯ r as in the proposition. Because of
∂y(x,z)
∂z > 0,
we can solve ¯ γ uniquely from equation (24). Hence, the system (12)-(14) has
a unique steady state with ¯ γ  = 0.
5.3 The Proof of Proposition 4
For this closed economy, the dynamic system can be written as
rt = θ0 + θrrt−1 + θppt−1 (26)
pt = α0 + αppt−1 + αyy(rt−1 − pt−1) (27)
with y′ < 0.




αyy′ αp − αyy′
 
20Thus, the characteristic equation takes the form
λ
2 − a1λ + a2 = 0
where
a1 = θr + αp − αyy
′, a2 = (αp − αyy
′)θr − θpαyy
′
Let us now derive the bifurcation θ∗
p on the assumption that the eigenvalues
λ1,2 are complex conjugates. This can be accomplished by assuming that the








(αp − αyy′)θr − 1
αyy′ (28)
For θ∗
p > 0, we request that
(αp − αyy
′)θr < 1
which is one of the conditions in (18). Given this θ∗
p, we shall now prove that
the eigenvalues λ1,2 are complex conjugates. This requests that a2
1−4a2 < 0,
that is,
(θr + αp − αyy
′)
2 − 4[(αp − αyy
′)θr − θpαyy
′] < 0 (29)
Substituting (28) into (29), the request (29) becomes
(θr + αp − αyy
′)
2 − 4 < 0
This inequality holds under the other condition in (18): θr + αp − αyy′ < 2.





2 and 3 in the proposition are thus proved.
5.4 The Proof of Proposition 5
Following the notation of y1 and y2, the Jacobian matrix J of the system at















21The characteristic equation takes the form
Γ(λ) ≡ λ
3 + c1λ
2 + c2λ + c3 = 0, (30)
where
c1 = −(1 + θr + αp − αyy1) +
αy¯ γy2
1 + ¯ p
,
c2 = θr + (1 + θr)(αp − αyy1) − θpαyy1 −
αyθr¯ γy2
1 + ¯ p
c3 = θpαyy1 − θr(αp − αyy1).
To ﬁnish the proof, we need the following lemma (see Elaydi 1996 and Sonis
2000).
Lemma 6 The eigenvalues λi(i = 1,2,3) of (30) satisfy |λi| < 1 for i =
1,2,3 if and only if Πj(j = 1,2,3) > 0 and c3 < 3, where
Π1 = 1 + c1 + c2 + c3;
Π2 = 1 − c1 + c2 − c3;




• on Π1 = 0 at least one of the eigenvalues is equal to 1;
• on Π2 = 0 at least one of the eigenvalues is equal to -1;
• on Π3 = 0 the three eigenvalues satisfy λ1,2 ∈ C and λ3 ∈ R with




1 + ¯ p
[1 − θr].
Hence, Π1 > 0 iﬀ θr < 1.
Π2 = 2[(1 + αp − αyy1)(1 + θr) − θpαyy1] −
1
1 + ¯ p
[αy¯ γy2(1 + θr)]
Therefore, Π2 > 0 iﬀ condition (20) holds. Substituting ci into Π3, we get
the expression in Proposition 5. Applying the above lemma completes the
proof.
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